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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AUDREY FORSMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
GEORGE FORSMAN, RONALD G. FLINDERS
and DOES I through X,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 860430

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Respondent Forsman addresses the following issues which are
presented by Mrs. Forsman*s appeal of the summary judgment in
favor of Mr. Forsman:
1.

Whether the district court properly dismissed

Mrs. Forsman's negligence action against her husband based on
the doctrine of interspousal immunity.
2.

Whether the district court properly applied Utah

choice of law rules in applying the law of the state where the
cause of action arose.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Forsman accepts his wife's statement of the case to the
extent that statement addresses the issues raised between them.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court properly granted summary judgment for
Mr. Forsman based on interspousal immunity.

Interspousal

immunity for ordinary negligence is an established part of the
law of Utah.

Upon reexamination, the bar against one spouse

suing the other continues to serve a vital and beneficent
purpose and should therefore remain the law of Utah, unless and
until the Utah legislature chooses to change that policy.
The District Court also properly applied Utah law as
opposed to California law in determining whether Mrs. Forsman
has a cause of action against Mr. Forsman.

Utah law provides

that the law of the place of the wrong governs even if the
parties to the action are from other jurisdictions.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CHANGE THE LAW TO
ALLOW MRS. FORSMAN TO SUE MR. FORSMAN FOR
NEGLIGENCE.
Since Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389
(1963), Utah has not permitted one spouse to sue the other for
ordinary negligence.

Rubalcava was decided after many juris-

dictions across the country had already chosen to eliminate
interspousal immunity.

See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 26 Cal.
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Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962).

Unlike some Utah Supreme Court

opinions from twenty years ago, Rubalcava is not a perfunctory
treatment of the issues. Rather, the Court thoroughly
addressed the arguments against interspousal immunity and
thoroughly stated its reasons for concluding that the law
should not allow a wife to sue a husband for ordinary negligence.

Mr. Forsman respectfully submits to this Court that our

social and legal structure is not so different today than it
was in 1963. The same logic that supported the decision in
Rubalcava supports affirmance of the District Court's decision
in this case.
There continue to be strong public policy reasons for
prohibiting one spouse from suing the other for ordinary
negligence.

Those policy reasons are as follows:

1.

Promotion of marital harmony;

2.

Prevention of collusive lawsuit;

3.

Avoidance of rewarding defendant spouse for his

or her own wrongdoing;
4.

Avoidance of the possibility of trivial or

spurious lawsuits between spouses; and
5.

A change in public policy of the State should

come from the Legislature.
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1.

Promotion of Marital Harmony

If a husband could sue his wife for an unintended wrong,
such suits might well create or aggravate marital discord.

In

Rubalcava, this Court recognized that "it should be the purpose
of the law to protect family solidarity."
391.

Id.

at 384 P.2d

Barring negligence suits between spouses promotes harmony

and tranquility in the home and allows spouses to resolve these
problems in a manner that may enhance the marital relationship.

It should be noted that since Rubalcava, the harshness

of this rule to the injured spouse has been softened considerably by the enactment of the no-fault insurance law.

That law

provides for payment of medical expenses and wage loss to an
injured spouse without the need for fault finding.

It is only

the further recovery which requires accusation and litigation
that should be forestalled.
As the Florida Supreme Court has stated:
When one ponders the effect upon the marriage relationship were each spouse free to sue the other for
every real or fancied wrong . . . one can imagine what
the havoc would be to the tranquility of the home.
Certainly the success of the . . . institution of
marriage must depend in large degree upon harmony
between the spouses, and the relationship could easily
be disrupted and the lives of offspring blighted if
bickerings blossomed into lawsuits and conjugal disputes into vexatious, if not expensive, litigation.
Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).

As further

explained in Thomas v. Harron, 20 Ohio 2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772,
775 (1969):

-4-

Litigation under these circumstances pits one spouse
against the other. Its necessary ingredients can
easily provide a source of serious irritation to the
marital relationship. Furthermore, if an incident
which occurred before marriage is imposed upon that
relationship by litigation, it is then possible, if
not probable, that that which should have been forgiven and forgotten will instead be destructive to
marital harmony.
The home, not the court, is the place for husband and wife
to resolve their differences.
This Court has recognized and discarded as unpersuasive
arguments to the contrary.

The first such argument is that

"the wrongful act has likely impaired the marital harmony
anyway, so the lawsuit would not extend the rift, but, if
anything, would tend to rectify it.M
389.

This Court was not persuaded.

Rubalcava, 384 P.2d at
Clearly, such an argument

has merit in the context of the commission of an intentional
tort.

That argument, however, has no merit in and should not

be extended to the commission of an unintentional tort.

There

is no reason to assume that an act of negligence reflects a
lack of marital harmony.
A second contrary argument is "that since the insurance
company, and not the defendant, will have to pay, the family
exchequer will not suffer so much by allowing the action as by
denying it, so the family harmony will not be harmed but may be
saved by allowing the action."

Id.

at 390-91.

Once again,

this Court in Rubalcava rejected as unpersuasive the argument
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that domestic harmony will not be impaired or that public
policy will be advanced by a lawsuit between spouses when the
defendant spouse is protected by liability insurance.
Rubalcava Court stated:

The

"The answer to the argument for

marital harmony, that this court will not be engendered when
the insurance company is to pay, is neither sound nor entirely
realistic."

Id., at 391.

Admittedly, where insurance coverage exists, the bringing
of a lawsuit may not always create or substantially enhance
marital discord, but there exists the likelihood of interspousal collusion, discussed infra.

To the extent that marital

disharmony would be reduced by the availability of insurance,
the potential for fraud is increased.

Where no threat of fraud

exists because there is no insurance, the risk of marital
discord is increased.

The Florida Court recently stated:

Adversary tort lawsuits between spouses have an
upsetting and embittering effect upon domestic
tranquility and the marital relationship. But
non-adversary lawsuits that do not disturb the peace
and harmony of the marriage encourage fraudulent and
collusive claims, particularly where a third-party
insurance company must pay any judgment awarded.
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 475 So.2d
1211, 1212 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d
352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)).

-6-

A third argument against the idea that such lawsuits would
inhibit marital harmony is that when one spouse brings a suit
against the other, there is little marital tranquility to
preserve.

That argument is unpersuasive.

Conjugal tranquility

may have been disturbed by the instigation of the lawsuit.
Clearly, the allegations, discovery, evidence, testimony and
posturing required to maintain or defend successfully a negligence action would create or aggravate tension and ruin an
otherwise salvageable marriage. Where insurance exists, as
discussed above, and the strong policy of marital tranquility
is realized, it is unreasonable to assume that the defendant
spouse, who continued living with the plaintiff spouse, would
defend and assist in the defense wholeheartedly.
Finally, Mrs. Forsman's reliance on this Court's decision
to strike down the guest statute is not well founded.

In

Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888 (Ohio
1978), the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a similar attempt to
analogize interspousal immunity to the guest statute.

The

Court concluded:
We think it sufficient to state that the interspousal
immunity doctrine, with its inherent differential
treatment of spouses and non-spouses, reasonably
relates to the legitimate state interest of fostering
marital harmony and preventing fraud and collusion.
The difference between this doctrine and [the guest
statute] lies in the higher state concern for regulating marriage and the greater potential for fraud
stemming from the marital relationship, where an
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insured defendant spouse stands to benefit personally
from losing a lawsuit instituted by his spouse.
383 N.E.2d at 889-90.
2.

Prevention of Collusive Lawsuits

A strong potential for collusive lawsuits between spouses
exists where an insurance company is the real party in
interest.

Three dangers exist.

The first danger is that

fraudulent or trumped-up claims will be made.

The second

danger is that even where the claims are not trumped-up, where
the marriage is harmonious, the offending spouse will not
defend the action zealously.

The third danger, as discussed

above, is that where the offending spouse does defend zealously
or wholeheartedly, as he or she should, tension and discord
will arise.

This Court in Rubalcava discarded any argument to

the contrary.

384 P.2d at 390-91.

The contention that courts are capable of weeding out
fraudulent claims has been addressed and rejected by many
courts.

As one court stated:

We expect too much of human nature if we believe that
a husband and wife who sleep in the same bed, eat at
the same table, and spend money from the same purse
can be truly adversary to each other in a lawsuit when
any judgment obtained by the plaintiff spouse will be
paid by an insurance company and will ultimately
benefit both spouses. . . .
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Furthermore, [these cases are] akin to the dangerously prevalent view that such payments are free if
the insurance company pays for it. Of course, someone, and us all, must pay insurance premiums which are
determined on the basis of risks and losses incurred.
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 475 So.2d
1211, 1213 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d
352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)).

See

also Green v. Green, 4 Ohio App. 3d 133, 446 N.E.2d 837, 838
(1982) ("The immunity prevents fraud and collusion at the
expense of tactically disadvantaged insurance companies");
Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E. 2d 533 (1965),
aff'd jLn Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 269, 383 N.E. 2d 888
(1978) ("It is argued that the task of weeding out fraudulent
or collusive suits is properly within the sphere of Courts and
juries.

In truly adversary cases, fraud is likely to be

uncovered because of the desire of the defendant to avoid the
loss.

Where insurance is involved, the risk of loss is

removed, and both spouses stand to gain from a decision adverse
to the defendant.

This creates a strong inducement to trump up

claims and conceal possible defenses"); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or.
286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) ("We revere the jury system as the
bulwark of individual liberty, but we are also realists, and we
know that juries are, as a Kentucky mountaineer once
said 'tolerable generous with other people's money, especially
when the aroma of insurance permeates the courtroom1").
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Although insurance companies may be able to protect themselves against fraudulent claims by excluding spousal coverage
in the policy itself (contractual interspousal immunity) or by
increasing insurance rates to offset the cost of fraudulent
claims (overall subsidization of the cost of collusive interspousal claims), public policy and familial relationships are
not enhanced by these alternatives.
3.

Avoidance of Rewarding Defendant Spouse for His or Her
Own Wrongdoing

In most cases after one spouse carelessly causes injury to
the other, the couple continues to cohabit.

Where one spouse

obtains a court judgment against the other spouse and they
continue to cohabit, it is reasonable to assume that the tortfeasor shares in the benefits of an award paid by his or her
insurance company.
717, 719 (1974).

Burns v. Burns, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty

Co. , 475 So.2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 1985) (citing Raisen v. Raisen,
379 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886
(1980)).

Public policy should disfavor a wrongdoer benefitting

from his or her tortious conduct.
4.

Avoidance of Trivial or Spurious Lawsuits Between
Spouses

In a marriage, man and wife are intimate emotionally,
psychologically and physically.

The relationship should be
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conducive to openness, compromise, adjustment and tolerance.
People in marriage let down their guards, as it should be.
However, because of individual differences and idiosyncrasies,
the potential for conflict, tension and carelessness also
exists.

Abolition of interspousal immunity torts could lead to

petty, trivial or spurious lawsuits over such conflicts.

One

can envision countless scenarios where conduct might be considered tortious but should not be considered actionable as
between spouses.

Some examples are shoveling the walks, waxing

the floor, taking out the garbage, caring for children,
unsatisfactory completion of other household duties and chores,
and contraceptive use or sexual proclivity.
The danger of opening the door to such actions exists and
is not imagined as described in Moore, The Case for Retention
of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 943, 949
(1980):
That the danger of what might be characterized as
strange and improbable suits is real is illustrated by
the cases of Mims v. Mims [305 So.2d 787 (Fla. 1974)],
and Brown v. Brown [409 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1980)].
In the former case, a wife sued her husband for having
fraudulently induced her to marry him "with false and
fraudulent protestations of love" and having thereafter told her that he did not love her and then
having left her (in a home defendant had purchased for
the parties), assertively having done all the preceding "with willfulness and malice." The Florida
District Court of Appeal (Fourth District) affirmed a
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judgment dismissing the action, citing interspousal
tort immunity and adding:
"The primary one [basis for denying this
claim] lies in the demands of public policy
which require, as we see it, that domestic
quarrels—who did what to whom before and
during the marriage—should not be the
subject of damage suits and jury trials."
In Brown, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that a wife, injured in a fall ascribable to her
husband's alleged negligence in failing to shovel the
walk after a snow storm, could not sue her spouse in
tort.
Regardless of whether abrogating spousal immunity would
result in a rash of these lawsuits, a significant question
before the Court is whether the door even should be opened to
allow the potential for these suits or whether public policy
should continue to encourage spouses to resolve these problems
in ways more susceptible of mending familial relationships.
5.

A Change in Public Policy of the State Should Come
From the Legislature

The abolition of interspousal immunity for negligence would
constitute a radical departure from existing public policy and
traditional practice.
debatable at best.

The desirability of such a change is

Any such modification of public policy and

the law should be left to legislative discretion.

As one Court

stated:
As to tort law, elimination of the doctrine could
. . . open up a possibility of tort actions . . . that
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could go to the heart of public policy and legislative
policy relating to marriage. . . . [T]he problem is
more appropriate for legislative solution than for
judicial determination. The General Assembly has
access to relevant information bearing upon these
matters more significant than afforded this
Court. . . .
Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Del. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980).

See also Rubalcava v.

Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 393 (1963) ("We are of
the opinion that under the circumstances, in fairness to those
who have relied thereon, and in proper deference to the solidarity of the law, any change could be justified only to
correct patent error, otherwise it should be made by the
legislature, plainly so declaring, so that all may be advised
what the change is and when it will be effective") (emphasis
added); Robeson v. International Indemnity Co., 282 S.E.2d 896
(Ga. 1981) ("it is a rather close question as to whether abrogation of the doctrine at this juncture would be a proper
exercise of judicial authority.

Although it is true that the

doctrine is of common-law origin, it is of long-standing
application; and it is not unrealistic to presume that people
have come to rely on it.

In addition, it is the General

Assembly and not this court that possesses the resources for
determining the viability of the various policy considerations.

On matters such as whether husbands and wives should be

allowed to sue each other in tort, the expressions of public
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policy should come from the legislative branch") (citing
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963));
Green v. Green, 4 Ohio App. 3d 133, 446 N.E. 2d 837, 838 (Ohio
App. 1982)("If there is to be change in the public policy of
the state [regarding interspousal immunity for unintentional
torts], it should emanate from the General Assembly") (citing
Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965));
6.

Summary.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondent submits that
this Court should affirm its decision in Rubalcava v.
Gisseman.

Perhaps more today than in 1963, the public policy

of this state should be to promote good marriages and to deter
collusive or trivial lawsuits.

Interspousal immunity from

negligence actions serves that policy well.

The District

Court's application of that rule to this case should be
affirmed.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED UTAH LAW
RATHER THAN CALIFORNIA LAW.
Mrs. Forsman argues that because she and her husband are
from California, her tort action should not be subject to the
laws of Utah.

This argument should be rejected for two
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reasons.

First, Mrs. Forsman's action only arises under the

laws of the State of Utah because that is where the accident
occurred.

Second, even if a choice of law is necessary, Utah

is the proper choice because it is the place where the alleged
tort occurred and it is the place where the dispute will be
resolved.

These reasons give the State of Utah a more sub-

stantial interest in the outcome of the litigation regardless
of whether the choice of law is based on lex loci delicti or on
the Restatement rule cited by Mrs. Forsman.
The negligence claim asserted by Mrs. Forsman is a transitory claim.

It arises, if at all, in the jurisdiction where

the allegedly negligent conduct took place.
took place exclusively in Utah.

Here, that conduct

For Mrs. Forsman to have a

claim against her husband, that claim must have arisen in Utah,
not in California.

Apparently, such an action against her

husband would have arisen in California; however, as Point I
explains, no such action arose as a result of the accident that
occurred in Utah.
Although this court has not recently addressed Utah's
choice of law rules, the existing rule is that the law of the
place of the wrong governs in a tort action.

That rule was

fairly recently applied by the Tenth Circuit in Madison v.
Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (1978).

There a wife

claimed that she was entitled to recover for loss of consortium
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under the laws of Arizona because she and her husband were
domiciled in Arizona.

However, the Tenth Circuit ruled that

because the accident occurred in Utah, the Utah court would
apply Utah law.

See also Jackson v. Continental Bank & Trust

Co., 443 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1971).

The Utah Supreme Court

has likewise looked to the place of the accident to determine
whether a guest passenger was entitled to recover against a
host driver.

See e.g. Wood v. Taylor, 8 Utah 2d 210, 332 P.2d

215 (1958) and Hudson v. Decker, 7 Utah 2d 24, 317 P.2d 594
(1957).

Hence, since the accident involving Mr. and Mrs.

Forsman occurred in the State of Utah, the lower court properly
applied Utah law in determining whether Mrs. Forsman had a
cause of action against Mr. Forsman.
Although this Court has not specifically ruled whether the
law of the place of the wrong should govern whether interspousal immunity exists, that has been the specific conclusion
in several jurisdictions.

In Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio 2d 243,

208 N.E.2d 533 (1965), the law of Ohio was applied to a negligence case where Ohio was both the place of injury and the
forum state.

The court refused to apply the law of Arizona

even though that was the domicile of the parties at the time
the action was filed.

Similarly, in Landers v. Landers, 153

Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966), the Connecticut court applied
Virginia law to preclude a wife from recovering against her
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husband even though the husband and wife were from Connecticut
and Connecticut was the forum state.

In Landers the

Connecticut court considered the Restatement rule, Restatement
(Second), Conflicts of Law § 169, and rejected it.
In Henry v. Henry, 291 N.C. 156, 229 S.E.2d 158 (1976), the
Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether the law of
Pennsylvania or the law of North Carolina governed a wife's
claim against her husband for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.

The accident occurred in North Carolina which

was the forum state however the couple was domiciled in
Pennsylvania at the time of the collision.

The husband moved

to dismiss his wife's complaint because the law of the forum in
which his wife had sued did not allow her to maintain a negligence action against him.
on appeal.

This motion was granted and affirmed

The North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned as fol-

lows:
The actionable quality of the defendant's conduct in
inflicting injury upon the plaintiff must be determined by the law of the place where the injury was
done; that is, the measure of the defendant's duty and
his liability for negligence must be determined by the
law of [North Carolina]. If an act does not give rise
to a cause of action where it is committed, the
general rule is that the party who commits the act
will not be liable elsewhere, and in such event it is
immaterial that a cause of action would have arisen if
the wrong had been done in the jurisdiction of the
forum.
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229 S.E.2d at 160, quoting Howard v. Howard, 158 S.E. 101 (N.C.
1931).

The court pointed out that opening the door for appli-

cation of the law of the domicile was opening the door for a
multitude of claims founded on the assertion that the law of
the domicile was more equitable and just than the law of the
site of the accident.
Mr. Forsman submits that this is just one of several
reasons for choosing Utah law over California law even if that
choice must be made.

As discussed in Point I, the reasons for

maintaining the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity go
beyond the individual relationship of Mr. and Mrs. Forsman or
any couple who ends up on opposite sides of litigation.

It is

the Utah courts, not the California courts, which are exposed
to the potential for fraud and collusion by a wife's action
against her husband.

Indeed even if the evil is not so

insidious as to amount to fraud or collusion, it remains the
Utah courts who must deal with the non-adversarial and therefore distorted nature of a wife's claim against her husband
which is obviously filed only to obtain insurance proceeds that
will benefit both of them.
Likewise, it is the Utah courts, not the California courts,
which would be subject to the trivial and spurious domestic
disputes which are possible if suits for ordinary negligence
are allowed between husband and wife.
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These concerns must be

added to the simple and traditionally most important fact that
the accident and injuries occurred in this state.
Further, Mrs. Forsman asks this Court to apply California
law to part of her claim against her husband while she is
making no argument that California law applies to her claim
against Ronald Flinders or the State of Utah.

In this context

the Restatement approach advocated by Mrs. Forsman promotes
undue complexity and uncertainty.

Part of the action would be

governed by Utah law and part of the action would be governed
by California law, depending on the countervailing interests of
each party as to each particular issue. Under these circumstances, the most efficient and most equitable result is to
apply the law of Utah to the entire action.
For these reasons, Mr. Forsman respectfully submits that
the District Court properly applied the law of Utah in determining whether a cause of action arose in favor of Mrs. Forsman
against her husband.
CONCLUSION
Interspousal immunity for negligence should remain intact
for the reasons set forth above.

Elimination of the immunity

would be a radical departure from the common law and the strong
public policy favoring the maintenance of familial relationships.

Inroads into familial and marital solidarity should be
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resisted.

In this case, that issue should be governed by Utah

law because Utah is where the action arose and because Utah is
the state which will be most affected by the case. Therefore,
the summary judgment granted in favor of Mr. Forsman should be
affirmed.
DATED this 9th day of January, 1987.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
KBymon^
John R. Lund
Attorneys for Defendant/
Respondent George Forsman
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